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IMPORTANT IS NOT IMPORTANT ENOUGH: 
FORCIBLY MEDICATING DEFENDANTS 
FOR SENTENCING USING THE IMPORTANT 
INTEREST STANDARD 
SARAH VIEBROCK† 
INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following hypothetical.  Jack is convicted of a 
felony in federal court.  Jack suffers from a mental illness.  
Shortly after his conviction, Jack starts hearing voices in his 
head.  Jack begins acting and feeling strange.  Jack does not 
want to take medication, and of course he has the right to refuse 
to do so.  Jack’s sentencing hearing is scheduled for next month, 
but the court worries that Jack may not be fit to continue with 
sentencing based on his recent behavior.  As a result, the court 
orders a hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241 to determine if 
Jack is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect 
rendering him incompetent to proceed with sentencing. 
At the hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Jack is presently suffering from a mental disease 
or defect and is incompetent to proceed with sentencing.1  Once 
deemed incompetent, Jack is hospitalized in a suitable facility 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).2  After several months, it 
appears unlikely that Jack will regain competency for 
† Notes and Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., magna cum laude, 
2016, St. John’s University School of Law. 
1 Competency requires that the defendant “understand the nature and 
consequences of the proceedings against him” and be able to participate in them. 
18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2012); see also United States v. Dreyer, 705 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 
2013); Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512, 518 (9th Cir. 1981). The competency 
statute was initially enacted in 1948 and was substantially revised in 1984 as part of 
an attempt to afford more protection to mentally ill defendants within the criminal 
law. 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 81-1319, at 1 (1949). 
2 This statute allows a court to hospitalize a defendant for treatment following a 
determination that the defendant is presently suffering a mental disease or defect 
rendering him incompetent to proceed with the proceedings against him. 
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sentencing.  The court is ready to provisionally sentence Jack 
under 18 U.S.C. § 4244(d) to a suitable facility for care or 
treatment until he regains competency or serves out the 
maximum term authorized for his crime.3  But the Government 
steps in, arguing that it has an important interest in sentencing 
Jack, and thus it should be permitted to forcibly medicate him in 
order to restore his competency.  Jack objects.  He does not want 
to be medicated, and he believes he has the right not to be 
medicated. 
There are several invaluable rights at stake for Jack.  First, 
he has a right to be free from unwarranted bodily intrusion.4  
Forcible medication would violate this right with no 
repercussions to the wrongdoer.  Second, through the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Jack 
has a protected liberty interest in avoiding forcible medication of 
antipsychotic drugs.5  Third, he has a constitutional right under 
the First Amendment to freedom of speech and thought.6  Fourth, 
Jack has a fundamental right to privacy, and forcible medication 
would interfere with this right.7 
Nevertheless, the Government argues that its important 
interest in sentencing Jack outweighs these significant 
individual rights.  The court agrees.  Jack is held down, sedated, 
and injected with antipsychotic medication.  The court proceeds 
to sentence him. 
 
3 This provision provides the court with a sentencing alternative for a defendant 
suffering from a mental disease or defect. 
4 Greater N.Y. Health Care Facilities Ass'n, Inc. v. Axelrod, 770 F. Supp. 183, 
187 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The Constitution does provide protection against unwanted 
bodily intrusion.”); United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 490 (4th Cir. 1987) 
(“Forcible medication with antipsychotic drugs implicates individual rights to 
freedom from physical invasion . . . as well as the right to privacy protected by the 
Constitution and the common law.”). 
5 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This right is recognized 
in all Supreme Court cases dealing with the issue of forcible medication. Sell v. 
United States, 539 U.S. 166, 183 (2003); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 133–34 
(1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990). 
6 Charters, 829 F.2d at 492 (“Such mind altering medication has the potential to 
allow the government to alter or control thinking and thereby to destroy the 
independence of thought and speech so crucial to a free society.”). 
7 Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1393 (10th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he decision whether 
to accept treatment with antipsychotic drugs is of sufficient importance to fall within 
this category of privacy interests protected by the Constitution.”). 
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The Government is able to step in and forcibly medicate Jack 
because of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Sell v. 
United States.8  In Sell, the Court created a four-part factors test, 
which, if established by the Government, allows the Government 
to forcibly medicate a defendant for the sole purpose of regaining 
competency for trial.9  Recently, the Sell factors test has been 
extended to apply in situations where the Government is seeking 
to forcibly medicate a defendant for sentencing as opposed to 
trial.10  This Note specifically focuses on the first factor of the Sell 
test, which requires that the Government demonstrate an 
important interest in forcibly medicating the defendant in order 
to proceed.11  This is the only factor that is purely a matter of law 
to be decided by the court.12  The other three factors include: 
(1) that the involuntary medication will significantly further the 
Government’s interests, (2) that the medication is necessary to 
further those interests, and (3) that administration of the drugs 
is medically appropriate.13  These three factors are largely 
dependent on the factual circumstances of individual cases.14  
While it is well established that the Government may have an 
important interest in forcibly medicating a defendant for trial,15 
only two lower courts have addressed the Government’s interest 
in forcibly medicating a defendant for sentencing.16 
This Note analyzes whether the Government’s interest in 
sentencing is the same as its interest in trial, and whether the 
“important interest” standard is a high enough threshold for the 
Government when it seeks to forcibly medicate a defendant for 
sentencing.17  This Note will conclude that because of the 
8 539 U.S. 166. 
9 Id. at 180–81. 
10 United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 240–41 (4th Cir. 2006). 
11 Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. 
12 United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 591, 598 (3rd Cir. 2008). 
13 Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. 
14 Grape, 549 F.3d at 598 (applying a clear error standard of review to factors 
two through four because of their factual nature). 
15 See United States v. Mikulich, 732 F.3d 692, 696 (6th Cir. 2013); United 
States v. Fazio, 599 F.3d 835, 839 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Renshaw, No. 
4:06CR-31-M., 2007 WL 2746675, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 18, 2007). 
16 United States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d 372, 383 (3rd Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Wood, 459 F. Supp. 2d 451, 457–58 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
17 This Note does not specifically explore the extension of the other three factors 
to the sentencing phase, but rather discusses how they help or harm the argument 
that the important interest standard is the appropriate threshold for the 
Government when it seeks to forcibly medicate a defendant for sentencing. 
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procedural alternatives to forcible medication at sentencing, the 
functional differences between trial and sentencing, and the 
spirit of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sell, the Government 
should be required to demonstrate a compelling, rather than an 
important, interest when it seeks to forcibly medicate a 
defendant for sentencing. 
Part I discusses the evolution of allowing a defendant to be 
forcibly medicated in order to withstand trial.  Part II discusses 
how this concept was extended to apply in situations where the 
Government seeks to forcibly medicate a defendant for 
sentencing.  Part III analyzes the arguments supporting the 
proposition that the Government’s interest in forcibly medicating 
a defendant for trial is essentially the same as its interest in 
sentencing.  Part IV presents the arguments as to why the 
Government’s interest in forcibly medicating a defendant for 
sentencing is different than its interest in forcibly medicating a 
defendant for trial.  Finally, Part V discusses why these 
differences call for a heightened standard when the Government 
seeks to forcibly medicate a defendant for sentencing as opposed 
to trial, and the practical effect of that heightened standard. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Initial Allowance of Forcible Medication to Dangerous 
Defendants 
The conflict between individual rights and the state’s 
interest in forcible medication first arose in a case involving a 
mentally ill prisoner who was a danger to himself and to others.  
In Washington v. Harper,18 the United States Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of “whether a judicial hearing is required 
before the State may treat a mentally ill prisoner with 
antipsychotic drugs against his will.”19  At the time of this 
decision, Washington state policy allowed inmates to be forcibly 
medicated pursuant to prison policy if certain conditions were 
met.20  Defendant Harper had been sentenced to prison for 
18 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
19 Id. at 213. 
20 Id. at 215–16. In order to be forcibly medicated the inmate must first “suffer[] 
from a ‘mental disorder’ and . . . [be] ‘gravely disabled’ or pose[] a ‘likelihood of 
serious harm’ to himself, others, or their property.” Id. at 215 (footnote omitted). The 
inmate is entitled to a hearing before a committee who determines if those 
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robbery and spent most of his incarceration housed in a mental 
health unit where, at first, he consented to administration of 
antipsychotic medication.21  Harper was eventually paroled on 
the condition that he continue to receive treatment.22  One year 
later, Harper assaulted two nurses, and his parole was revoked.23  
Upon his return to prison, he was diagnosed with manic-
depressive disorder but refused treatment.24  As a result, the 
treating physician sought to medicate Harper over his objections 
pursuant to prison policy.25  An administrative hearing was 
conducted, and the committee found that involuntary medication 
was appropriate.26 
Harper eventually filed suit under 42 U.S.C § 1983, claiming 
that the failure to provide a judicial hearing before involuntary 
administration of antipsychotic medication violated both 
Substantive and Procedural Due Process, Equal Protection, and 
the Free Speech Clauses of both state and federal constitutions.27  
The lower court held that even considering Harper’s liberty 
interest, the procedures governing involuntary administration of 
antipsychotic medication met the requirements of due process.28  
The Washington Supreme Court reversed and remanded the 
case, holding that the “highly intrusive nature” of the treatment 
in this case required the state to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the “medication was both necessary and effective 
for furthering a compelling state interest.”29  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and reversed, holding that, “given the 
requirements of the prison environment, the Due Process Clause 
permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious 
mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the 
inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in 
the inmate’s medical interest.”30  Thus, the Supreme Court held 
requirements are met. Id. The inmate also has “certain procedural rights before, 
during, and after the hearing.” Id. at 216. This “involuntary medication can continue 
only with periodic review.” Id. 
21 Id. at 213. 
22 Id. at 214. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 217. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 217–18. 
29 Id. at 218. 
30 Id. at 227. 
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that the state’s policy was permissible under the Constitution 
because it balanced the inmate’s liberty interest in being free 
from forced administration of antipsychotic drugs and the state’s 
interest in providing treatment to an inmate who is a danger to 
himself and others.31 
The Supreme Court revisited the balancing of these interests 
two years later in Riggins v. Nevada,32 this time finding that the 
state’s interests were not essential enough to allow forcible 
medication of a pre-trial detainee.33  In Riggins, defendant 
Riggins was awaiting his trial for murder and robbery charges 
when a psychiatrist prescribed him medication to help with the 
voices he was hearing and his sleeping problems.34  The lower 
court conducted a hearing and determined that Riggins was 
competent to withstand trial.35  Shortly thereafter, Riggins 
sought to suspend his medication until after his trial, arguing 
that the medication would alter the way the jury saw him and 
thus might negatively impact his insanity defense.36  After an 
evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Riggins’s motion.37  He 
pursued the insanity defense but was convicted and sentenced to 
death.38  Riggins then challenged his conviction, arguing that his  
 
 
 
 
31 Id. at 236. 
32 504 U.S. 127 (1992). 
33 Id. at 138. 
34 Id. at 129. 
35 Id. at 129–30. Three court-appointed psychiatrists performed examinations of 
Riggins while he was taking daily antipsychotic medication. Id. Two out of the three 
doctors found Riggins competent to withstand trial. Id. at 130. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 130–31. The district court heard testimony from the treating 
physicians. Id. One doctor “guess[ed]” that taking Riggins off medication would not 
render him incompetent to withstand trial and would not lead to a noticeable change 
in his behavior. Id. at 130 (alteration in original). Another doctor opined that 
Riggins would be competent without the medication, but that the jurors would not 
notice the effects of the medication. Id. A third doctor was unable to predict what 
would happen if Riggins went off his medication, but questioned if Riggins really 
needed the high dose he was receiving. Id. at 131. The doctor who previously found 
Riggins incompetent also submitted a written report, holding to his earlier opinion 
and expressing concern about what would happen if Riggins was taken off 
medication. Id. The decision to deny the motion was one page long and did not 
indicate the court’s rationale. Id. 
38 Id. 
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constitutional rights were violated when he was forced to take 
drugs, and that these drugs “denied him the ability to assist in 
his own defense and prejudicially affected his attitude, 
appearance, and demeanor at trial.”39 
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Riggins’s convictions, 
holding that the forcible medication did not violate his trial 
rights.40  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide 
whether Riggins’s trial rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments were violated.41  The Court held that “[b]ecause the 
record contains no finding that might support a conclusion that 
administration of antipsychotic medication was necessary to 
accomplish an essential state policy . . . we have no basis for 
saying that the substantial probability of trial prejudice in this 
case was justified.”42  In other words, the Court was not 
convinced that the state had met its burden in showing that the 
treatment was medically appropriate and essential for the sake 
of Riggins’s own safety or the safety of others.43  The Riggins 
Court reiterated that an individual has an important liberty 
interest in remaining free from unwanted administration of 
antipsychotic drugs, and that only an essential state interest 
could override this liberty interest.44 
B. The Sell Test: Forcibly Medicating Defendants for Trial 
Purposes 
The concept of balancing the liberty interests of the 
defendant against an important state interest set the stage for 
the Court’s opinion in Sell v. United States.45  Charles Sell was a 
practicing dentist and had a long history of mental illness.46  On 
multiple occasions, Sell was hospitalized and treated with 
antipsychotic medications for reasons not involving criminal 
39 Id. Riggins argued that this prejudice was not justified because the state did 
not demonstrate a need to administer the drugs, and it did not explore alternatives 
to the medication. Id. 
40 Id. at 132. The court held that the expert testimony sufficiently informed the 
jurors about the effects of the medication, and thus the lower court did not abuse its 
discretion or violate Riggins’s trial rights. Id. 
41 Id. at 132–33. 
42 Id. at 138. 
43 Id. at 135. 
44 Id. at 136. 
45 539 U.S. 166, 167 (2003). 
46 Id. at 169. 
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activity.47  Sell was charged with fifty-six counts of mail fraud, 
six counts of Medicaid fraud, and one count of money 
laundering.48  A Magistrate Judge, aware of Sell’s psychotic 
breaks, found Sell “currently competent,” and released him on 
bail.49  However, the Magistrate Judge later held a bail 
revocation hearing as a result of the Government’s claim that 
Sell had sought to intimidate a witness.50  Sell’s outlandish 
behavior, a psychiatrist’s report, and other testimony at the 
hearing led the Magistrate Judge to revoke Sell’s bail.51  Later 
that year, a new indictment was issued charging Sell with 
attempting to murder the FBI agent who arrested him and a 
former employee who planned to be a witness in the fraud case.52  
These charges were combined with the fraud charges for trial 
purposes.53 
Thereafter, Sell sought reconsideration of his competency to 
stand trial.54  After an examination at the United States Medical 
Center for Federal Prisoners (“Medical Center”), the Magistrate 
Judge determined Sell was incompetent to stand trial and 
ordered that he be hospitalized for treatment for up to four 
months in order to determine the probability that Sell would ever 
regain competency for trial.55  Two months into his stay, Sell 
began refusing the staff’s recommendation that he take 
antipsychotic medication.56  The center then “sought permission 
to administer the medication against Sell’s will.”57 
The decision to forcibly medicate Sell was first made by a 
reviewing physician who considered, among other things, Sell’s 
prior history, his current state, and additional medical opinions.58  
47 Id. at 169–70. 
48 Id. at 170. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 171. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. Some examples of the type of information the physician took into account 
include: Sell’s belief that the Government was trying to suppress his knowledge 
about certain events and silence him, medical opinions that pointed to a diagnosis of 
a Delusional Disorder with underlying Schizophrenic Process, medical concerns 
about the persistence of his government conspiracy belief, and Sell’s own view that 
he did not suffer from mental illness. Id. 
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The physician authorized the administration of the medication 
because Sell was mentally ill and dangerous, and the medication 
would help render him competent to stand trial.59  Next, the 
Medical Center administratively reviewed this decision, reviewed 
the evidence, and upheld the physician’s decision.60  Soon after, 
Sell challenged the Medical Center’s right to forcibly medicate 
him.61  The Magistrate Judge reviewed the evidence, agreed with 
the Medical Center’s opinion, and issued an order authorizing the 
center to administer the medication to Sell against his will.62  
The district court reviewed the Magistrate Judge’s decision and 
held that the finding that Sell was a danger to himself and others 
was “clearly erroneous.”63  Nevertheless, the district court upheld 
the Magistrate’s Order allowing involuntary administration of 
the drugs for the sole purpose of rendering the defendant 
competent for trial.64  Both parties appealed, and the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s judgment.65  The Supreme Court granted 
59 Id. at 171–72. 
60 Id. at 172. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 172−73. The Magistrate Judge based his finding of dangerousness on 
the defendant’s belief that everyone is out to get him—arguing it increases the 
likelihood that he will try to protect himself by being violent towards others—the 
violent nature of Sell’s offenses, the defendant’s alleged infatuation with a nurse, 
and his animosity towards the prison psychologist. United States v. Sell, No. 4:97 
CR 290 DJS, 4:98 CR 177 DJS, 2001 WL 35838455, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 4, 2001), 
aff'd, 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2002), vacated, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
63 Sell, 539 U.S. at 173−74. A district court judge can reconsider any pretrial 
matter decided by a Magistrate Judge where that order has been shown to be 
completely erroneous or contrary to law. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2012). Here, the 
district court held the finding of dangerousness to be clearly erroneous because the 
record did not indicate the defendant “posed a danger to himself or others during the 
period of his institutionalization at the USMC, and the statements and conduct 
relied upon for a finding of dangerousness do not suggest a threat of violence to the 
staff.” Sell, 2001 WL 35838455, at *5. 
64 Sell, 2001 WL 35838455, at *8. The court based its decision on three findings. 
Id. These findings were that the drugs were medically appropriate for the defendant, 
that they were the only viable hope of rendering the defendant competent for trial, 
and that the drugs appeared to be necessary to serve the Government’s compelling 
interest in bringing the defendant to trial. Id. 
65 Sell, 539 U.S. at 174. Sell asked the Eighth Circuit to decide whether the 
lower court erred in holding that he could be forcibly medicated for the sole purpose 
of restoring his competency for trial. United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 565 (8th 
Cir. 2002). He also asked whether the lower court applied the correct standard of 
review, whether it properly considered his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial,  
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certiorari to determine whether the Government can forcibly 
medicate a defendant solely to render him competent to stand 
trial for nonviolent offenses.66 
Unlike Harper and Riggins, the Sell Court was forced to 
address the issue of involuntary medication solely for trial 
competence purposes, leaving aside the dangerousness of the 
defendant, and the violent nature of the defendant’s crime.67  The 
Sell Court discussed the tensions at play, reiterating the 
defendant’s liberty interest in remaining free from unwanted 
medications and the state’s possible interest in rendering the 
defendant competent.68  Considering these competing interests, 
the Sell Court dictated a factors test to be used in order to 
determine whether drugs may be administered involuntarily 
solely for the purpose of trial: (1) there must be an important 
Government interest at stake; (2) the court must conclude that 
involuntary medication will significantly further those interests; 
(3) the involuntary administration of medication must be 
necessary to further the important interest at stake; and 
(4) administration of the drugs must be medically appropriate.69  
The rationale behind this test was to confine forcible medication 
for trial competence to very rare circumstances in order to 
preserve the important liberty interest an individual has in 
remaining free from unwanted medication.70 
Ultimately, the Sell Court determined that the court of 
appeals erred in its decision to allow forcible medication of Sell 
solely to render him competent to stand trial because the four 
factors were not met.71  First, the Court stated that the lower 
courts, as well as the expert witnesses, focused on the 
dangerousness issue rather than trial competence.72  As a result, 
important questions about trial-related side effects and risks 
were not asked or answered.73  Thus, the Court was unable to 
and whether the Government proved by clear and convincing evidence that the 
medication was appropriate and would likely restore his competency. Id. The 
Government argued that the lower court did not err on those grounds, and that the 
district court’s finding that Sell was not dangerous was erroneous. Id. 
66 Sell, 539 U.S. at 175. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 177. 
69 Id. at 180−81. 
70 Id. at 180. 
71 Id. at 186. 
72 Id. at 185. 
73 Id. 
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conclude whether Sell would be prejudiced and whether his trial 
rights would be violated by the forcible medication.74  
Additionally, the lower courts did not consider the amount of 
time Sell had already spent confined, and that his refusal to take 
the medication “might result in further lengthy confinement.”75  
Those two factors could possibly mitigate the importance of the 
governmental interest in prosecution.76  Consequently, the 
Supreme Court held that Sell’s forcible medication could not 
stand.77  Despite this particular outcome, the Sell test has 
become the standard for determining the constitutionality of 
forcibly medicating a defendant for trial.78 
II. FORCIBLY MEDICATING DEFENDANTS FOR SENTENCING 
A. An Issue of First Impression: Extending the Sell Factors to 
Sentencing 
While the Sell test is consistently used to determine whether 
a nondangerous defendant can be forcibly medicated for trial, 
there remains an unanswered question:  whether the same 
analysis governs a situation in which the Government seeks to 
forcibly medicate a defendant for sentencing.  Recently, several 
lower courts have been faced with this issue of first impression 
and have attempted to answer it. 
In 2006, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
extended the Sell test to apply to situations where the 
Government seeks to forcibly medicate the defendant for 
sentencing.79  In United States v. Baldovinos,80 the court used the 
Sell test to determine whether the defendant’s sentence should 
be vacated because he was involuntarily medicated with 
antipsychotic drugs in order to regain competency for 
sentencing.81  Baldovinos’s mental health problems began after 
he had already been convicted at trial and before his sentencing 
hearing.82  Due to his troubling behavior on several occasions, 
74 Id. at 185–86. 
75 Id. at 186. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 591, 598 (3rd Cir. 2008). 
79 United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 238–39 (4th Cir. 2006). 
80 434 F.3d 233. 
81 Id. at 240–41. 
82 Id. at 235–36. 
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Baldovinos was treated with short-acting antipsychotic 
medication.83  The treating physicians ultimately determined 
that Baldovinos was not competent to be sentenced, but they 
believed that they could render him competent with medication.84  
The district court agreed with the treating physicians’ report and 
thus extended his commitment period for continued treatment.85  
Sixteen months later, the physicians determined Baldovinos was 
competent to be sentenced.86  In those sixteen months, the 
physicians changed his diagnoses twice and altered the type and 
amount of his medication several times.87  Based on the 
physicians’ recommendation, the court proceeded to sentence 
Baldovinos to a total term of 120 months in prison.88  Baldovinos 
appealed, arguing that his sentence should be vacated due to the 
fact that he was medicated against his will.89 
The court used the Sell principles in its analysis as opposed 
to weighing the defendant’s liberty interests against the state’s 
interest in protecting the defendant and others from danger, like 
in Harper.  The court’s rationale was that “the Government’s 
overriding purpose in medicating Baldovinos was to render him 
mentally competent to be sentenced,” not to address his 
dangerousness.90  The court acknowledged that it was unresolved 
whether the Sell principles allow the Government to forcibly 
medicate the defendant for sentencing, but did not address this 
issue directly.91  The Government conceded that, under the Sell 
principles, the district court plainly erred92 by allowing 
Baldovinos to be forcibly medicated, but urged the court not to 
recognize the error because those involved medicated him in good 
faith, believing medication was in his best interest.93  The court 
83 Id. at 236. Specifically, Baldovinos was seen in the fetal position on the floor 
under the bed, and would alternatively remain crouched for several hours in a 
corner of his room or in the shower. Id. He would not respond to the staff, and when 
he was touched by the staff, he would become upset and appeared frightened. Id. He 
ate little food and he soiled himself, but “resisted staff members’ efforts to move and 
clean him.” Id. 
84 Id. at 236. 
85 Id. at 237. 
86 Id. at 238. 
87 Id. at 237–38. 
88 Id. at 238. 
89 Id. at 238–39. 
90 Id. at 241. 
91 Id. at 243 n.7. 
92 Id. at 239. 
93 Id. at 242. 
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declined to recognize any plain error that occurred, but not based 
on the Government’s good faith argument.94  It reasoned that 
Baldovinos had already been medicated and it could not undo 
that.95  Moreover, since Baldovinos had received the minimum 
sentence for his crimes, the court was unable to conclude “any 
error in medicating Baldovinos against his will seriously affected 
the ‘fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.’ ”96  Thus, the court did not engage in a full analysis 
of the Sell factors test as applied to Baldovinos. 
Similarly, later that same year, a Virginia district court 
followed the Baldovinos court’s determination that the Sell 
factors apply in the sentencing context.97  In United States v. 
Wood,98 defendant John Wood had a long history of mental illness 
and was often going on and off his medication.99  Wood pled guilty 
to making false bomb threats by telephone.100  The court found 
that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, but grappled 
with the issue of whether Mr. Wood could be involuntarily 
medicated for sentencing.101  Both parties agreed that the 
defendant should be forcibly medicated, but disagreed as to 
whether he should be sentenced or provisionally sentenced once 
the medicating took place.102 
For the first time, a court considered each of the factors laid 
out by the Sell Court in the sentencing context.103  First, the court 
held that the Government had an important interest in forcibly 
medicating the defendant for sentencing “because doing so 
furthers Congress’ goal that the sentence a defendant receives 
should accurately reflect the real nature of his offense, and 
should be tailored to the defendant’s circumstances.”104  In 
94 Id. at 243. 
95 Id. at 242. 
96 Id. at 243 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)). 
97 United States v. Wood, 459 F. Supp. 2d 451, 456–57 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
98 459 F. Supp. 2d 451. 
99 Id. at 453–55. 
100 Id. at 454. 
101 Id. at 454–55. 
102 Id. at 455. The defendant asserted that forcible medication should be ordered 
to restore the defendant to competence and proceed with sentencing. Id. The 
Government argued that the defendant should be provisionally sentenced under 
18 U.S.C. § 4244(d) with a view towards restoring competency, and the sentencing 
could be revisited once competency is restored. Id. 
103 Id. at 456–57. 
104 Id. at 458. 
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support of this holding, the court discussed Congress’s enactment 
of the Federal Sentencing Act and the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, which were aimed at achieving “similar relationships 
between sentences and real conduct.”105  Stressing Congress’s 
intention, the court held that sentencing a defendant is a critical 
step in achieving these goals, and thus the Government had an 
important interest.106 
Second, the court found by clear and convincing evidence 
that the medication was substantially likely to render the 
defendant competent, and that it was substantially likely that 
the medication’s side effects would not substantially interfere 
with his ability to assist counsel in the proceeding.107  Third, the 
court found involuntary administration of medication to be 
necessary, and that there were no less intrusive alternatives due 
to Mr. Wood’s reluctance to comply with treatment plans and 
inability to recognize his mental disease.108  Fourth and finally, 
the court found the administration of medication to be medically 
appropriate based on Mr. Wood’s medical history, and the 
treatment of his mental illness in general.109  Following this 
analysis, the court granted the Government’s request that Mr. 
Wood be forcibly medicated in order to render him competent for 
sentencing, but denied the Government’s request that Mr. Wood 
be provisionally sentenced.110 
B. Finding a Governmental Interest in Forcibly Medicating for 
Sentencing 
The above line of cases influenced the recent decision in 
United States v. Cruz,111 where the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit confronted a matter of first 
105 Id. (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253–54 (2005)). 
106 Id. at 458–59. The court also concluded that there were no special 
circumstances in this case that made the Government’s interest “less exigent.” Id. at 
459. 
107 Id. at 460. 
108 Id. at 461. 
109 Id. The court stated that the proposed medical regimen appeared unlikely to 
harm Mr. Wood since he does not have any underlying medical conditions that 
would caution the use of antipsychotic medication. Id. Additionally, the court used 
evidence that early treatment of schizophrenia improves chances of recovery, and 
that the disease worsens if untreated. Id. 
110 Id. at 462. 
111 757 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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impression.112  The issue was “whether the Government . . . can 
have a sufficiently important interest in forcibly medicating a 
defendant to restore his mental competency and render him fit to 
proceed with sentencing.”113  Defendant Cruz was found guilty of 
two counts of threatening a federal law enforcement officer, but 
before the sentencing hearing could take place, the Government 
expressed concerns about his competency.114  The district court 
found Cruz to be incompetent and thus did not proceed with 
sentencing.115  Cruz continued to refuse medication, and the 
Government sought approval to have Cruz medicated against his 
will.116  Using the Sell criteria as a basis for its analysis, the 
district court found that the four Sell factors were sufficiently 
satisfied and ordered defendant’s forcible medication.117 
Cruz moved for a stay of the district court’s order, 
specifically challenging the court’s finding in regard to the first 
factor of the Sell test: the finding of an important interest.118  The 
district court cited Wood and argued that the Government had an 
important interest in making sure the defendant’s sentence 
adequately reflects his crime and the circumstances.119  In 
addition, the district court found that there were no special 
circumstances that would lessen the Government’s interest.120  
On appeal, Cruz raised several arguments to demonstrate that 
this first factor of the Sell test was not adequately met.121  He 
argued that the Government’s interest is lessened because the 
intent is to restore his competency for sentencing, as opposed to a 
trial.122  Cruz further argued that the likelihood of him being 
civilly committed constitutes a special circumstance that lessens 
the Government’s interest.123 
112 Id. at 374. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 375. 
117 Id. at 376. 
118 Id. at 377. 
119 Id. at 376. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 377–78. 
122 Id. at 378. 
123 Id. Cruz also argued that his crimes are less violent than precedent cases, 
and that the court’s dependence on the presentence report was misplaced. Id. Those 
arguments are not relevant to this analysis. Civil commitment is authorized for 
persons whose sentence is about to expire, or who have been committed to the 
custody of the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), or for persons 
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The court of appeals reviewed for plain error and found that 
the district court did not plainly err in finding an important 
Government interest.124  The court found the Wood court’s 
rationale highly persuasive and reiterated the idea that the 
Government has an important interest in formal sentencing 
procedures in order to achieve uniformity.125  Additionally, the 
Cruz court addressed the argument that sentencing proceedings 
should be differentiated from the trial phase because of the Sell 
court’s emphasis on the “pre-trial nature of the proceedings.”126  
The court responded that the sentencing phase of prosecution has 
similar procedural concerns127 to those at the trial phase, and 
thus the Government’s interest is just as important at sentencing 
as it is at trial.128  Further, the Cruz court rejected the argument 
that the court’s ability to provisionally sentence undermines the 
Government’s interest, arguing that provisional sentences cannot 
bring finality to a criminal case the same way sentencing 
proceedings can.129  Finally, the court reasoned that Cruz’s 
crimes were serious enough to create a governmental interest in 
preserving “human security.”130  For these reasons, the court of 
appeals affirmed the order of the district court.131 
III. THE GOVERNMENT’S IMPORTANT INTEREST IN SENTENCING A 
DEFENDANT 
In Sell, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
Government may have an important interest in forcibly 
medicating a defendant for trial.132  The reasoning of the Sell 
Court rested on the procedural aspects of a trial, such as 
presentation of evidence and witness testimony, as well as the 
against whom criminal charges have been dismissed as a result of a mental 
condition if the release of such person would create a substantial risk of bodily injury 
to another person or serious damage to property. 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2006). Cruz 
argued that his dangerous behavior was likely to result in civil commitment, but the 
court of appeals did not agree. Cruz, 757 F.3d at 378. 
124 Id. at 389. 
125 Id. at 384. 
126 Id. at 384–85. 
127 These concerns include memories fading and evidence lost. Id. at 385–86. 
128 Id. at 385. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 387. 
131 Id. at 389. 
132 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003). 
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purposes behind having a trial.133  There are several arguments 
to be made that the procedural and substantive aspects of 
sentencing proceedings are no less important to the Government.  
These arguments provide some support for the use of the 
important interest standard as the first factor for seeking to 
forcibly medicate defendants for sentencing, but are 
unconvincing. 
First, similar to the Government’s interest in timely 
prosecution, the Government has an interest in a timely 
sentencing procedure.134  There are two main reasons why the 
Government has an interest in speedy sentencing.  The first 
reason is concern about memories fading and losing evidence.135  
As expressed by the Cruz court, this concern “applies with equal 
force to both the jury’s determination of a defendant’s guilt and 
the court’s sentencing determinations.”136  This is because, like in 
trial, it may be hard to conduct a fair sentencing hearing without 
prejudice to the defendant if memories have faded and evidence 
is lost, since the court largely depends on a presentence report.137  
There are many fact-finding procedures in a sentencing, and it is 
beneficial to the court and to the defendant if memories of these 
facts are fresh since they will greatly influence the defendant’s 
sentence.138 
The second reason rests on the idea of judicial efficiency.139  
One can never be certain if or when an incompetent person is 
suddenly going to be competent again.140  As a result, it may be 
133 Id. 
134 Cruz, 757 F.3d at 384–86. 
135 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972). Prejudice to the defendant is the 
fourth and most serious factor in determining whether a defendant’s right to a 
speedy trial has been violated because a defendant must be able to adequately 
prepare his or her case. Id. (“If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the 
prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall 
accurately events of the distant past.”). This factor remains a consideration when 
the court seeks to determine whether a defendant’s right to a speedy sentencing has 
been violated. See Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 253–54 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing 
cases). 
136 Cruz, 757 F.3d at 385. 
137 Id. at 385–86. 
138 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (discussing the factual circumstances that receive 
consideration in sentencing). 
139 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003). 
140 See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2012) (allowing periodic review of a person’s 
competency). The individual remains in treatment until the court finds that there is 
a “substantial probability” he or she will regain competency in an additional amount 
of time. Id. 
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many years before a guilty person actually receives his or her 
sentence.141  In the interim between conviction and sentencing, 
the court does not sit idly by until the defendant is suddenly 
ready to be sentenced.142  Instead, the court must actively use 
judicial resources in order to monitor the defendant’s progress 
and competency.143  Thus, the extra time between the close of 
trial and sentencing proceeding requires the expenditure of extra 
judicial resources.  In addition, allowing too many years to go by 
between a guilty conviction and a sentencing procedure might 
result in courts being flooded with cases which may never come 
to a close.  These cases remain on the court’s docket, causing 
congestion.  Accordingly, the Government has an interest in 
making sure judicial resources are used efficiently, and that 
sentencing is completed within a reasonable time. 
Second, the Government has an interest in completing the 
criminal justice process and ensuring that the purposes of the 
criminal justice system are being furthered.144  The criminal law 
serves many purposes, and sentencing a defendant plays a 
crucial role in furthering these purposes.145  For the Government, 
the trial phase is only one part of the adjudicative process, and 
determination of the defendant’s punishment is a critical part of 
the criminal process.146  “Both the deterrent and retributive 
purposes of the criminal law are better served . . . by quicker 
resolutions, as expressed by the aphorism ‘justice delayed is 
justice denied.’ ”147  The Wood court utilized this argument, 
stating that the “sentencing phase of a criminal prosecution 
is . . . a critical step in the criminal justice process that Congress  
 
 
141 Id. 
142 § 4241(d)–(e) (describing the role of the court following a finding that the 
defendant is incompetent to stand trial); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (describing the ordinary 
role of the court after trial and before sentencing). 
143 § 4241(d). 
144 2 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE § 15.01 (4th ed. 2006). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. § 8.01; see also United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1371 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(Noonan, J., dissenting) (“To deny that the sentencing process is part of a criminal 
prosecution is to cut out the guts of criminal prosecution as it is conducted in our 
courts.”). 
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designed.”148  Thus, if the Government is unable to complete the 
criminal justice process by punishing the criminal defendant, 
then the purposes of the criminal justice system are not being 
served.149 
Third, the Government has a responsibility to conclude the 
criminal justice process in order to protect the public.150  One of 
the driving forces behind criminal punishment is to ensure that 
the community feels safe, and sentencing defendants to the 
proper punishment is one way of achieving this goal.151  The 
Government “seeks to protect through application of the criminal 
law the basic human need for security.”152  The Cruz court 
highlighted this argument by suggesting that the Government’s 
interest in securing the community does not end after the trial 
phase of the criminal process, but instead carries over to the 
sentencing phase of the process.153  Accordingly, the Government 
has an interest in incapacitating the individual in order to 
prevent further harm to society.154  Further, it may be argued 
that incapacitation in a medical facility does not sufficiently 
punish the individual or put the community at ease.  Thus, if an 
incompetent defendant is not forcibly medicated, and as a result 
never receives his or her sentence, the community will experience 
a sense of unrest that the criminal justice system is designed to 
eliminate. 
Fourth, the Government has an interest in enforcing the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984155 and the United States Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines156 in order to ensure fairness and 
148 United States v. Wood, 459 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
149 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 2.01 (6th ed. 2012). 
150 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 144, § 15.01. 
151 Id. 
152 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003); see also DRESSLER, supra 
note 149, § 2.03 (defining incapacitation as a goal of the criminal justice system). 
153 United States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d 372, 384–85 (3rd Cir. 2014). 
154 DRESSLER, supra note 149, § 2.03. 
155 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2012). 
156 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2012). The Guidelines were not implemented until 
1987 and were not fully operational until 1989. John S. Martin, Jr., The Role of the 
Departure Power in Reducing Injustice and Unwarranted Disparity Under the 
Sentencing Guidelines, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 259, 259 (2000). The Guidelines 
established an independent commission in the judicial branch. § 991(b). The purpose 
of this commission is to ensure the purposes of the Sentencing Act are being fulfilled. 
Id. This includes, providing certainty, fairness, and flexibility in sentencing. Id. 
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uniformity in sentencing.157  As the Wood court observed, forcibly 
medicating a defendant for sentencing is an important 
governmental interest because “there is a very important, 
legislatively articulated, governmental interest in achieving fair, 
reasonable and non-disparate sentences for similarly situated 
defendants who have engaged in similar conduct.”158  If the court 
decides to provisionally sentence the defendant, then there is no 
consideration for other similarly situated defendants who have 
engaged in similar conduct because the statute requires the 
defendant to serve out the maximum term authorized by the 
statute as a default. 159  Thus, if the defendant is provisionally 
sentenced, the presentence fact-finding procedures are 
eliminated.160  Consequently, a formal sentencing would be more 
effective in furthering the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act 
and Sentencing Guidelines. 
Fifth, the Government arguably has an important interest in 
forcibly medicating a defendant for sentencing because the 
person is no longer a pretrial detainee, but rather a convicted 
criminal.161  In the trial context, the individual is innocent until 
proven guilty and forcibly medicating this “innocent” person 
could be less justified if it turns out that the defendant did not 
actually commit the crime he or she is charged with.162  In such a 
situation, the Government may have violated the defendant’s due 
157 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1984) (“These provisions introduce a totally new 
and comprehensive sentencing system that is based upon a coherent philosophy. 
They rely upon detailed guidelines for sentencing similarly situated offenders in 
order to provide for a greater certainty and uniformity in sentencing.”). 
158 United States v. Wood, 459 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459 (E.D. Va. 2006); see also 
Cruz, 757 F.3d at 383. 
159 18 U.S.C. § 4244(d) (2012). 
160 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (describing the pre-sentence investigations and 
findings of fact that typically take place before a sentencing). These procedures are 
designed to contribute to a fair, reasonable, and nondisparate sentence. United 
States v. Trevino, 556 F.2d 1265, 1270 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[A] presentence report serves 
not as a prosecutorial tool but as an informative document for the guidance of the 
court.”); United States v. Hogan, 489 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (“[T]he 
primary function of the probation department in the preparation of a presentence 
investigation report is to provide the sentencing judge with objective and accurate 
information relating to the defendant.”). 
161 Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1856 
(2003) (“The notion would be that, once convicted of the crime, the defendant is not 
entitled to special protection from the punishment for which that conviction makes 
him eligible.”). 
162 Id. at 1855–56. 
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process rights without any benefits to society.163  By contrast, an 
individual being sentenced has already been found guilty, so the 
risk of violating an innocent person’s rights does not exist.164  
Instead, the Government’s guaranteed purpose is to sentence a 
convicted person rather than to bring a potentially innocent 
person to trial.165 
Overall, the Government undoubtedly has interests in 
forcibly medicating a defendant for sentencing.  As explored 
supra, many of the Government’s interests in sentencing are 
similar to those interests that the Government has in bringing a 
defendant to trial.166  The Wood and Cruz courts held that the 
Government’s interests in sentencing are of the same importance 
as the Government’s interests in proceeding to trial.167  As a 
result, those courts did not hesitate to hold that the first factor of 
the Sell test was an appropriate burden for the Government to 
have to meet when seeking to forcibly medicate a defendant for 
sentencing.  Those courts, however, did not engage in a complete 
analysis of the differences between trial proceedings and 
sentencing proceedings that might make the Government’s 
interests less compelling. 
IV. WHY FORCIBLY MEDICATING DEFENDANTS FOR TRIAL IS 
DIFFERENT THAN SENTENCING 
The function of a trial and the function of sentencing have 
always been, and still are, distinct in the law.  A trial is “[a] 
formal judicial examination of evidence and determination of 
legal claims in an adversary proceeding.”168  In contrast, 
sentencing is “[t]he judicial determination of the penalty for a 
crime.”169  As described by William Blackstone in the 1800s, “the 
imposition of punishment was not considered part of the criminal 
trial; rather, it constituted a separate phase of criminal 
163 Id. at 1856–57. 
164 Id. (“The convicted individual facing sentencing is, by definition, not 
innocent. Retributive and utilitarian concerns about the high cost of punishing the 
innocent (or risking doing so) might be deemed inapplicable.”). 
165 Id. 
166 See supra Part III. 
167 United States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d 372, 384 (3rd Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Wood, 459 F. Supp. 2d 451, 458 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
168 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1735 (10th ed. 2014). 
169 Id. at 1570. 
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proceedings that followed the conclusion of the trial.”170  
Additionally, early decisions of American courts support the 
notion that trials are separate and distinct from sentencing.171  
Even today, trial and sentencing are defined differently by the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.172  Each process is governed 
by different rules and procedures, and the defendant is afforded 
different rights at each stage.173  These two stages are treated 
differently because they are distinct processes with different 
goals in mind.174  This long history of distinction supports the 
conclusion that the governmental interest in bringing a 
defendant to trial is different than its interest in sentencing by 
nature of the two processes and the goals achieved by each. 
A. The Government’s Interest in Sentencing Is Less than in Trial 
There are many reasons why the Government’s interest in 
forcibly medicating a defendant is lessened in a sentencing.  The 
first reason is that the Government’s interest is lessened by its 
ability to provisionally sentence a defendant under 
18 U.S.C. § 4244(d).175  The statute provides that a defendant 
who is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect be 
committed to a suitable facility for care or treatment instead of 
being sentenced.176  The commitment constitutes a provisional 
sentence to the maximum term authorized for the specific 
offense.177  This provision was part of the Insanity Defense 
Reform Act, which was enacted to provide uniform procedure for 
delinquents suffering from mental disease or defect at the time of 
trial, at sentencing or when he or she is set to be released.178  
Specifically, the fact-finding procedures found in § 4244—
psychiatric exam, report to the court, hearing and judicial 
finding—are aimed at formalizing the court procedures for such 
170 United States v. Ray, 578 F.3d 184, 195 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *368). 
171 See id. at 195–96 (collecting cases). 
172 Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 23–31 (pertaining to trials), with FED. R. CRIM. P. 
32 (governing post-trial procedures). 
173 Michaels, supra note 161, at 1778; Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 
(1949). 
174 See Michaels, supra note 161, at 1773 (citing Williams, 337 U.S. at 246). 
175 18 U.S.C. § 4244(d) (2012); see supra note 3. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 H.R. REP. NO. 81-1319, at 1 (1949). 
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similarly situated accused persons.179  Consequently, a 
provisional sentence under § 4244 can be a suitable alternative to 
a formal sentence since it contains its own fact-finding 
procedures,180 and aims to achieve the goal of uniformity stressed 
by the Sentencing Reform Act and Sentencing Guidelines.181 
In the past, courts have been reluctant to accept the 
provisional sentencing statute as an acceptable alternative to 
sentencing.182  Courts hesitate because the statute requires 
commitment for the maximum term authorized for the offense, 
and often this would result in the individual serving more time in 
a facility than he or she would have had he or she received an 
actual sentence.183  However, this Note does not argue that 
provisional sentencing is always the best alternative for 
defendants who refuse to take medication, but rather that as an 
available option, it undermines the Government’s interest in 
forcibly medicating a defendant purely to proceed with a formal 
sentencing procedure. 
In fact, the possibility of lengthy confinement in a facility 
through a provisional sentence has, on occasion, led the 
Government to concede that its interest was not great enough to 
forcibly medicate the defendant.184  In United States v. Perez-
Rubalcava,185 the defendant was found guilty of reentry following 
deportation, but was found incompetent to withstand 
sentencing.186  The defendant was then provisionally sentenced 
under 18 U.S.C. § 4244(d) to twenty years in a suitable facility.187  
179 Id. 
180 The Wood court argued that a provisional sentence “shortcuts the factfinding 
procedure . . . and arrives at an accurate sentence only by coincidence.” United 
States v. Wood, 459 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459 (E.D. Va. 2006). While the fact-finding 
procedures required under 18 U.S.C. § 4244 are different than the fact-finding 
procedures that take place at a traditional sentencing, they still serve the purpose of 
informing the judge of the best sentence for that defendant. H.R. REP. NO. 81-1319, 
at 1. 
181 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1984). 
182 United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 242–43 (4th Cir. 2006); Wood, 459 
F. Supp. 2d at 459. 
183 Baldovinos, 434 F.3d at 242–43. There, the statutory maximum for the crime 
defendant committed totaled forty years, which was four times more than the 
sentence defendant had already received. Id. 
184 United States v. Perez-Rubalcava, No. CR-03-20018-RMW, 2008 WL 
4601024, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2008). 
185 2008 WL 4601024. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. This was the maximum authorized sentence by law for the defendant’s 
offense. Id. 
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At that time, the Government did not seek to provisionally 
sentence the defendant, reasoning that the defendant’s refusal to 
take drugs voluntarily would result in lengthy confinement in a 
suitable facility, and that this would “diminish the risks that 
ordinarily attach to freeing without punishment one who has 
committed a serious crime.”188  The Government conceded that 
the purposes of criminal punishment would be met without 
violating the defendant’s rights through forcible medication.189  
Based on the Government’s position, the court declined to 
involuntarily medicate the defendant, stating that the 
Government’s interest did not seem to justify it.190  Four years 
later, the Government sought to forcibly medicate the defendant 
to restore his competency for sentencing.191  However, the court 
denied the motion, finding that the first factor of the Sell test 
was not met, and that the Government had already “in large part 
obtained the deterrence and other goals of a criminal conviction 
and sentence.”192 
The court’s holding in Perez-Rubalcava suggests that the 
ability of the court to provisionally sentence mentally ill 
defendants seriously undermines the Government’s interest in 
forcibly medicating defendants for sentencing.  Once the 
Government has achieved the goals of criminal punishment 
through a provisional sentence, it is hard to justify violating a 
defendant’s rights just to formally sentence him or her.  
Furthermore, courts should not hesitate to provisionally sentence 
defendants because it might result in a lengthy confinement.  
The provisional sentence statute requires the defendant be 
committed for the maximum term authorized by the statute for 
the crime.193  This is a legislatively approved sentence, which 
furthers rehabilitative and incapacitation principles of criminal 
punishment. 
The second reason why the Government’s interest in forcibly 
medicating a defendant is lessened in a sentencing is due to the 
differences between purposes of criminal punishment achieved at 
the trial stage and at the sentencing stage.  Such differences 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at *2. 
193 18 U.S.C. § 4244(d) (2012). 
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support the conclusion that the Government’s interest in 
sentencing is not the same as in trial.  One of the main purposes 
of convicting and sentencing defendants is to create a sense of 
security for the community.194  The community wants to know 
that those who have committed crimes are punished for their 
crimes and that society does not have to fear that person.195  
Arguably, once the guilty conviction has been determined, the 
criminal justice system has already worked to put the community 
at ease.  The community is now aware that this is someone who 
will be punished for his or her crimes.  Additionally, if the 
convicted person is refusing medication and the court finds him 
or her incompetent to proceed, then this person is going to be 
placed in a suitable facility, again maintaining the safety of the 
community.196  Accordingly, the guilty conviction, coupled with 
the fact that anyone the Government is seeking to forcibly 
medicate will be placed in a facility, is all the assurance that the 
community needs to feel safe.197  Consequently, the Government 
has already done its part in protecting the community by getting 
the guilty verdict, and its actual interest in formally sentencing 
the defendant has decreased. 
Third, forcibly medicating a convicted individual is not 
fulfilling the rehabilitative purpose of criminal punishment.  By 
forcibly medicating a defendant for sentencing, the Government 
is only temporarily restoring competency and is not truly seeking 
to “rehabilitate” the individual.198  Instead, the Government’s 
goal in seeking to forcibly medicate the defendant is solely for the 
194 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (2012). 
195 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 36 (1984). 
196 18 U.S.C. § 4244(d) (2012). The distinction between a forensic psychiatric 
facility and a prison is insignificant for punishment purposes. The defendant is still 
being punished by being involuntarily held in a secure environment. 
197 The forensic psychiatric facilities where incompetent defendants go when 
they are provisionally sentenced are maximum security facilities.  
See Kirby Forensic Psychiatric Center, OFF. MENTAL HEALTH, 
https://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/facilities/krpc/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2016); Donna 
Riemer, Creating Sanctuary: Reducing Violence in a Maximum Security  
Forensic Psychiatric Hospital Unit, INT’L ASS’N FORENSIC NURSES, 
http://www.forensicnurses.org/?page=302 (last visited Mar. 8, 2016) (discussing the 
setting of a maximum security psychiatric facility). 
198 This proposition is analogous to that discussed in cases which deal with 
whether an inmate sentenced to death can be forcibly medicated in order to render 
him or her competent to be executed. See Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1036 
(8th Cir. 2003) (Heaney, J., dissenting); Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 61 (S.C. 
1993); State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 755 (La. 1992). 
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purpose of restoring mental competency to proceed with 
sentencing and punish the defendant.199  There is no guarantee 
that after one instance of forcible medication, he or she will 
continue to take medication.  Rehabilitation would be better 
served if the defendant were provisionally sentenced to a 
treatment facility where the staff is well equipped to deal with 
mentally ill individuals.200  Accordingly, if most of the goals of 
criminal punishment can be met through the provisional 
sentence, the governmental interest in sentencing the defendant 
by violating important individual rights is reduced. 
Fourth, the side effects of antipsychotic medication can have 
a significant impact on a defendant’s right to be reasonably heard 
at sentencing, also known as allocution.201  While not a 
constitutionally protected right, “[t]he right to allocution is an 
integral part of the sentencing process which if not fully afforded 
to the defendant requires a reversal of the sentence imposed.”202  
The purpose of allocution is to allow the defendant to be heard by 
the judge when he or she makes the ultimate decision in regards 
to sentencing.203  If a defendant does not want to be medicated for 
sentencing, then forcibly medicating this person for the purpose 
of sentencing interferes with his or her right to speak honestly 
and openly to the judge at sentencing.  In other words, the person 
who appears before the judge filled with antipsychotic medication 
is not the same person that committed the crime, and that person 
has a right to be heard by the judge. 
199 Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1036 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (“At the very least, the 
setting of an execution date calls into question the State's true motivation for 
administering the medication in the first instance.”); Perry, 610 So. 2d at 755 
(concluding that Washington v. Harper “sets forth a due process standard . . . [which] 
strongly implies that antipsychotic drugs absolutely may not be used as a tool for 
punishment”). 
200 See Riemer, supra note 197. 
201 See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(i) (stating the defendant must be 
afforded the opportunity to be heard through his attorney before a sentence is 
imposed). 
202 United States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1025 (10th Cir. 1993). 
203 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(i); see also Kimberly A. Thomas, Beyond 
Mitigation: Towards A Theory of Allocution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2641, 2655 (2007) 
(discussing the theory of mitigation as the purpose behind allocution). 
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B. Extending Sell Is Contrary to the Spirit of the Opinion 
Finally, the spirit of the United States Supreme Court 
decision, in Sell v. United States,204 suggests that it was not 
meant to be extended to apply in the sentencing context.  The 
Sell Court was careful to emphasize that forcible medication 
should be used in very rare circumstances.205  The question 
presented before the Sell Court was whether a defendant can be 
forcibly medicated to be rendered competent for trial.206  With 
much consideration for the defendant’s rights, the Court 
developed a four-part factors test to ensure that forcible 
medication would only be used when it was absolutely necessary 
and effective.207  To extend this holding to include situations 
where the Government is seeking to forcibly medicate defendants 
for sentencing without extra consideration of the defendant’s 
rights and the interests at stake is a misapplication of Sell.208 
In Baldovinos, the Fourth Circuit decided for the first time 
that it would use the Sell principles to govern its analysis of 
whether the defendant could be forcibly medicated for 
sentencing.209  The court’s only consideration was whether 
Harper or Sell should apply, and it ultimately decided to apply 
the Sell test since the defendant was not dangerous.210  The 
Baldovinos court failed to discuss the substantial difference 
between the present case and Sell, which was that the 
Government was not seeking to medicate the defendant for trial, 
but for sentencing.211  As a result, the very first application of the 
Sell test to the sentencing context was done without any 
consideration for the differences between trial and sentencing.212  
Thus, the Baldovinos court completely ignored the Sell Court’s 
prudence in creating the factors test as a balancing mechanism 
for the defendant’s rights and the Government’s interest in 
proceeding with trial.  It was not long before both the Wood and 
Cruz courts used the Baldovinos extension of the Sell holding, 
204 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
205 Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. 
206 Id. at 169. 
207 Id. at 180–81. 
208 Pet. Reh’g En Banc and Panel Reh’g at 3, United States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d 
372 (3rd Cir. 2014) (No. 13-4378). 
209 United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 241 (4th Cir. 2006). 
210 Id. at 239–41. 
211 See id. at 240–41. 
212 See id. 
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again without consideration of the implied narrowness of the 
decision.213  Accordingly, the extension of the Sell holding without 
careful consideration of the Supreme Court’s warning that 
forcible medication should be used in “rare circumstances” was a 
misapplication of the decision. 
Furthermore, the Sell Court’s emphasis on the pre-trial 
nature of the proceedings suggests that the Government’s 
interest in forcibly medicating a defendant for sentencing should 
be treated differently.214  While there are still concerns about 
memories fading and lost evidence, the need for immediacy at 
sentencing is not as great as in trial.215  This is because before 
trial there is a significant risk of prejudice to the defendant while 
he awaits trial.216  This prejudice includes, “public scorn, 
deprivation of employment, disruption of family life, and the 
detrimental impact on the individual when jailed awaiting 
trial.”217  However, many of these interests disappear after a 
conviction, since the individual is now a convicted person and not 
a potentially innocent pretrial detainee.218  Similarly, the stated 
interest of minimizing anxiety and concern before trial219 is less 
compelling since the anxiety that an accused person experiences 
“is not to be equated for constitutional purposes with anxiety 
suffered by one who is convicted, in jail, unquestionably going to 
serve a sentence, and only waiting to learn how long that 
sentence will be.”220  These different concerns suggest that there 
are reasons to treat the two processes differently. 
Finally, while there is still concern for memories fading and 
lost evidence, there are other important evidentiary concerns for 
the incompetent defendant at sentencing.  Formal sentencing 
procedures heavily rely on a collection of all relevant facts about 
the defendant, which contribute to a fair sentence.221  The 
defendant who is deemed incompetent to be sentenced is not 
213 United States v. Wood, 459 F. Supp. 2d 451, 456–61 (E.D. Va. 2006); United 
States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d 372, 381–89 (3rd Cir. 2014). 
214 Sell v. United States. 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003) (“[I]t may be difficult or 
impossible to try a defendant who regains competence after years of commitment 
during which memories may fade and evidence may be lost.”). 
215 Perez v. Sullivan, 793 F.2d 249, 256 (10th Cir. 1986). 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972). 
220 Perez, 793 F.2d at 257. 
221 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)–(d). 
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ready to be sentenced, and as a result, the evidence needed to 
sentence this defendant is not ready yet either.222  Thus, instead 
of being concerned about the fading memories and lost evidence, 
the court should be concerned with undeveloped evidence when it 
seeks to sentence an incompetent defendant. 
V. A CALL FOR A HEIGHTENED STANDARD FOR THE GOVERNMENT 
The differences between trial and sentencing, along with the 
spirit of the Sell decision, should have resulted in a more in-
depth analysis by the Wood and Cruz courts when they held that 
the Government may have an important interest in forcibly 
medicating a defendant for sentencing.  While the Cruz and 
Wood courts did consider some of the implications, they did not 
reach the proper conclusion. 
The differences between trial and sentencing and the nature 
of the Sell holding lead to the conclusion that the Government 
should have to meet a higher burden when seeking to forcibly 
medicate a defendant for sentencing.  Thus, in the sentencing 
context, the first Sell factor should be changed to require that the 
Government demonstrate a compelling interest in forcibly 
medicating the defendant for sentencing.  A compelling interest 
standard would acknowledge that there are differences between 
trial and sentencing, and thus would more appropriately balance 
the interests of the Government and those of the defendant.  
Furthermore, raising the standard based on these differences 
would help to maintain the spirit of the Sell decision.  With the 
compelling interest standard, there is still the possibility that 
defendants can be forcibly medicated for sentencing, but it will 
only occur in the rarest and most appropriate circumstances.  For 
these reasons, the first factor of the Sell test should be changed 
from requiring an important interest to requiring a compelling 
interest when the Government seeks to forcibly administer 
medication to a defendant for the purpose of rendering him or 
her competent to withstand sentencing. 
As a practical matter, there is no exact formula for what 
constitutes a compelling government interest.  Some factors that 
might contribute to a finding of a compelling interest include 
222 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264–65 (2005) (arguing that the 
features of the remaining Sentencing Guideline “continue to move sentencing in 
Congress' preferred direction, helping to avoid excessive sentencing disparities while 
maintaining flexibility sufficient to individualize sentences where necessary”). 
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exceptionally complex factual findings at trial, the nature and 
extent of the defendant’s crimes and the defendant’s effect on 
society, whether a provisional sentence, as opposed to a formal 
sentence, would result in an extremely disparate sentence for the 
defendant, and where the defendant is likely to serve time if 
formally sentenced. 
Take, for example, the hypothetical defendant Jack.  
Imagine Jack was involved in an ongoing conspiracy scheme to 
defraud the Government.  The trial went on for many months 
because the testimony was endless, and the court’s opinion spent 
twenty pages discussing the findings of fact.  Also, imagine that 
the maximum term authorized by the statute is twenty years in 
prison, but that Jack’s co-conspirators are each receiving five 
years.  Additionally, if formally sentenced, Jack is likely to be 
placed in a secure and suitable medical facility where he can 
continue to receive treatment.  The Government may have a 
compelling interest in forcibly medicating Jack since there are 
compelling concerns about keeping the complex factual evidence 
fresh.  There is a big difference between the provisional sentence 
Jack would receive and the actual sentence he would receive, and 
Jack is likely to get the rehabilitative help he needs if formally 
sentenced. 
Now imagine, instead, Jack conspires to commit an armed 
robbery.  The facts of the case are not that complicated, and the 
trial takes two days to complete.  Imagine the maximum term 
authorized by the statute is eight years, and that Jack’s co-
conspirators each receive six years in prison.  If Jack is formally 
sentenced, he is likely to serve out his sentence in a federal 
prison.  Here, the Government’s interest is not compelling 
because there are no significant evidentiary concerns, the 
sentence Jack would receive provisionally is not so disparate as 
to justify violating individual rights, and Jack would receive 
better rehabilitative care through treatment in a suitable facility 
than in a federal prison. 
CONCLUSION 
Though the Sell test is an appropriate test to balance the 
interests of the defendant and the Government when seeking to 
forcibly medicate a defendant for trial, it is not appropriate in the 
sentencing context.  Trials and sentencing have always been 
distinct from one another and there are reasons for the 
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distinction.  As this Note argues, there are more important 
interests at stake for the Government in the trial phase than in 
sentencing, which involve both the principles and procedures of 
criminal punishment.  Furthermore, an extension of the 
important interest standard to the sentencing context without 
extra consideration of individual liberties and governmental 
interests is contrary to the spirit of the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Sell.  Accordingly, the first factor of the Sell 
test as applied in the sentencing context should require the 
Government to prove a compelling interest in order to account for 
the differences between trial and sentencing and to preserve the 
essence of Sell. 
